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Summary findings
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, Trinidad and  alleviate pressure for protection.  The danger: such
Tobago, and Uruguay undertook extensive trade reform  measures (unrelated to long-run price trends) can
at a time of crisis, at which time institutional reform was  become permanent.
difficult to undertake.  Many of the countries had become  *  External commitments (through the WTO or
members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  customs unions) can be used to discourage a return to
(GATT) in the late 1980s and anticipated institutional  protection.
reform. Only later did they reform trade policymaking  * Extending reform (to labor and capital markets and
institutions to bring them somewhat in line with trade  the regulatory framework) will help maintain and extend
policy regimes and GATT rules.  trade liberalization. Allowing factors of production  to
These countries have all used reference prices and  move smoothly from one activity to another could help
antidumping provisions of the GATT, rather than  prevent the buildup of pressares that lead to protection.
safeguards, to provide relief from import surges. They  *  An institution to consider exceptional protection
have all tried to centralize trade policy by moving it from  should be advisory (independent  of day-to-day trade
different agencies into a single agency. Despite  policymaking), so that it works steadily, free from
liberalization, some sectors - including automobiles,  administrative pressures and exigencies. Requests for
textiles, and agriculture - remain protected.  protection must be handled openly and transparently,
Lessons Rajapatirana draws from experience in these  with the findings subject to public scrutiny. Procedures
countries:  for granting relief through safeguards and similar
* The deteriorating macroeconomic situations are the  mechanisms must reflect all interests, including those of
main challenge to maintaining open trade policy.  consumers, exporters,  and users of the product.
* Trade policymaking must be constantly reviewed to  *  The analysis to establish injury must conform to
prevent reversals, and the costs of protection must be  high technical standards. The criteria to consider trade
communicated to the public at large.  policies must reflect national interests, not those of any
- There must be short-run measures to help domestic  particular sector.
activities adjust to short-run price movements and
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The paper examines the experiences of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica,
Uruguay and Trinidad and Tobago in broad terms to identify the post trade liberalization
policy and institutional challenges, using examples of the evolution of trade policies and
institutional arrangements in these countries to illustrate the main issues.
The challenges to maintaining liberalized trade regimes and advancing the
agenda for more open trade  depend both on the existing policy framework and the
institutional set up.  On the  policy front,  the requirements are to devise the means to
prevent external shocks from turning into crises and to maintain the policy regime
steadfast in terms of uniformity ofprotection  among sectors.  On the institutionalfront,
the task is to reform and create institutions that can deal with the challenges arisingfrom
changed political equilibrium due to both external shocks and the building up of lobbying
power of some groups over others to secure for  themselves a departure from  uniformity
in protection.
While the trade reforms were extensive, none of the countries reformed their
institutional arrangements for trade policy making at the time of these reforms.  As trade
liberalizations were undertaken at times of crises, institutional reforms were difficult to
undertake at the same time. Also, many of the countries had become GATT members in
late 1  980s and were anticipating future institutional reforms.  It was only later that
institutions were reformed to bring about some degree of conformity of trade policy
making institutions with the trade policy regimes.
The institutional reforms lend themselves to afew  generalizations.  First,
institutional reforms followed  trade policy reforms.  Second, there was an attempt to
centralize trade policy making by moving itfrom  different agencies to a single agency.
Third, despite the liberalizations, some sectors such as automobiles, textiles and
agriculture continued to be protected  Fourth, these countries have used reference pricesii
and anti-dumping rather than safeguards to provide relieffrom  import surges.  Fifth,
many countries made their  institutions more consistent with GA  TT rules.
Few lessons arise from the experience of these countries. First, the largest
challenge to maintaining  open trade regimes on the policy side arises from the
macroeconomic situation.  Second, trade policy making has to be kept under constant
review ifreversals are to be avoided and the cost ofprotection  must be publicized and
communicated to the community at large. Third, there must be measures that help with
the adjustment of domestic activities to short run price movements that do not lead to
protection.  The danger is that these measures can become permanent and unrelated to
long price term trends. Fourth, external commitments can be used to discourage a return
to protection  through GATT bindings and Common External Tariff agreements (CET)
under customs unions.  Finally, a continuing reform agenda that extends beyond trade
policies and includes elements of labor, capital markets and the regulatoryframework
would help to maintain liberalized trade regimes and push the trade agenda further.
Factors ofproduction,  if allowed to move from one activity to another smoothly, could
prevent the build up ofpressures  that lead to protection.
The design of an institution to consider exceptional protection should have the
following  characteristics.  First, make it advisory, independent of day to day trade policy
making so that it could conduct its work in a steady manner,  free from administrative
pressures and exigencies. Second, inquiries into the requests  for protection must be
conducted in an open and transparent manner and the findings of such inquiries must be
subject to public scrutiny.  Third, the procedures for granting relief such as through a
safeguard mechanism must reflect all interests and parties including consumers,
exporters and users of the product in question as an input. Finally, the analysis used to
establish injury must conform to high technical standards and the criteria usedfor
considering trade policies must always reflect national interests and not that of any
particular sector.Post Trade Liberalization Policy and Institutional Challenges
in Latin America and the Caribbean
I. Introduction
With the strong  trade reforms  in the late 1  980s  and early 1  990s,  many countries  in the
Latin America  and the Caribbean  region  are facing  new policy  and institutional  challenges. On
the policy front there are two major challenges. The first is to maintain  open trade regimes  in the
face of continuous  pressure  to protect  one sector  or another. The second  is to push the trade
liberalization  agenda  further  especially  in the light of new opportunities  for increasing trade
with improved  market access  provided  by the Uruguay  Round.  On the institutional  front,  the
challenges  are to  adopt existing  institutions  that were the products  of a bygone  era of protection
to a new era of more open trade  and to modemize  the trade policy  making institutions  to reflect
the changed rules of intemational  trade following  the Uruguay  Round. The policy  and
institutional  challenges  are closely  released.
This paper attempts  to identify  these  policy  and institutional  challenges  at the national
level for a selected  group of Latin  American  and Caribbean  countries,  against  the backdrop  of
existing  trade regimes  that came  into being in the last ten years. Not all trade liberalizations  were
complete. Few  sectors  continued  to be protected  and many institutions  that were conceived  in an
earlier  era such  as trade policy  making  agencies,  procedures  and decision  mechanisms,  rules,
laws and regulations  have continued. Many of the trade policy  related  institutions  and their
processes  remain  out of step with freer  trade. The paper notes  that new forms of protection  have
emerged  that attempt  to replace  the more  traditional  measures. In the wake of policy  reforms,
many  countries  have attempted  to improve  their trade policy  making  institutions  with varying
degrees  of success. The paper  notes  the experiences  at the time of trade liberalization,  some
partial reversals  of policy  since  then and identifies  the attributes  that are needed  to meet the
challenges  of maintaining open trade regimes  and advance  the agenda  for further  liberalization.2
The paper examines the experiences of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, Uruguay
and Trinidad and Tobago in broad terms so as to identify the post trade liberalization challenges,
using examples of the evolution of trade regimes and institutional arrangements in  these
countries to illustrate the main issues.
Following this introduction, Section II identifies the analytical issues that are relevant to
examine the post trade liberalization challenges. Section III  examines the nature of the
liberalizations and the extent to which the present challenges are rooted in those liberalizations.
Section IV recounts the post trade liberalization experiences of the six countries in terms of
policy reforms and institutional changes. Section V draws a number of  lessons and remedies to
maintaining and advancing the trade liberalizations achieved in the past decade.
II.  Post Trade Liberalization - Analytical Issues
Trade liberalization involves the replacement of quantitative restrictions with tariffs,
reduction of those tariffs  to lower  protection, reduction of  the variance  in  protection across
activities  and increasing the transparency  of trade policy making.  These measures are intended
to provide clear signals to current and potential investors in the tradeable sector regarding the
continuance of  the liberalized regime.  This latter point would depend very much on the
institutional environment for trade policy making.  Who makes trade policy, what are the rules
and procedures involved?  Which institutions consider the  request for protection and departures
from uniform protection? In what form is relief granted to domestic industry in times of distress?
These  are important analytical issues on the institutional side.  They are less well understood
than issues on the policy side.
The issues in trade policy making have been well understood during the past twenty five
years, due to the very successful analytical efforts put in by a group of highly distinguished trade
theorists.'  There has been  since, a growing consensus that the contribution of liberal trade
See for instance  the work  of Corden (1974),  Little,  Scitovsky  and Scott  (1970),  Ja,dish Bhagwati  (1978) and
Anne  0.  Krueger  (I1978).3
regimes for efficiency lies equally if not more on the uniformity of protection rather than its
level.  While there is an obvious trade-off between the level and the variance in protection akin to
the  mean variance issue in statistical analysis, there is a growing consensus that reducing the
variance in protection would deserve a greater weight than a low mean.2 This arises from the
fact that the variance of protection is both a product of political economy elements at play during
a liberalization process as well a factor behind the spread of protection from particular sectors or
activities to others. 3 The logic of this proposition is clear.  If all sectors had the same lobbying
power, then the variance could be either small or zero (a uniform tariff case), but giving equal
protection to all has no benefit to any sector or activity.  If some sectors are able to secure higher
protection than others, the variance would increase.  The ability to resist pressures to protect
some sectors more than others is the key challenge.  Here, institutions come to play a major role.
Solid institutions that are created to balance the interests of all are an antidote against  reversals
in trade policies.
The outcome of  a trade  liberalization reflects the strength of national interests
triumphing over sectoral interests.  In the lexicon of political economy analysis, this outcome
reflects at a given point in time, the clearing of the market for protection.  Protection is
demanded by different interest groups, whether they be a given sector, or a well identified
pressure group such as labor. The price of protection is what society pays in terms of  the
resultant misallocation of resources with its negative  impact on economic growth  over time.
That price can be reduced  when both supply and demand for protection are made to intersect  at
a low price, so that the resource costs of protection are minimized.  The particular balance of
interests that lead to a liberalization in the first place  can shift over time.  This shift  can be due
to some exogenous event, such as an external shock that leads to  an appreciation of the exchange
rate  or  a change in government, (a political shock).  Or it could be endogenous, lilce  the
increase in protection that can take place through a  gathering of momentum for protection from
2  Variance  in protection  drives  wedges  among  activities  and  interferes  with  the  allocation  of
resources  based  on comparative  advantage.
3Sebastian  Edwards "Openness, Trade Liberalization and Growth in Developing Countries" Journal of Economic
Literature, vol. 31, (September 1993) pp. 1358-1393.4
an incomplete liberalization of  the past, where some interests  were  able to gamer political
support to bring about  a departure from uniformity  by lobbying and changing the balance of
interests that had led to the trade liberalization in the first place.
Nearly all the cases of trade liberalizations in the 1  980s and 1  990s were undertaken
during periods of huge macroeconomic crisis, the resulting unavailability of foreign exchange to
support an overvalued exchange rate  and when policy choices were highly circumscribed.  These
crises helped to concentrate  interests  in reforming  governments to put national interests over
sectoral interests.  The availability of  balance of payments support such as those from the
multilateral financial institutions that underwrote these trade liberalizations did help, but  the
trade liberalizations could not have taken place without the national interests becoming
dominant, resulting in a  shift in power to  those who favor reform and away from  those who
were opposed to it.  The dominance of national interests is reflected  in the reduction  in
protection and the reduction in its variance.
Some sectors have continued to receive protection reflecting their powerful representation
in the policy making bodies and the political clout that is generally wielded through the threat of
huge disruptions arising form large unemployment, unavailability of key goods and services and
simply through the importance of a particular  constituency due to  historical reasons.
It must be clear then  that the challenges to maintaining the liberalized trade regimes and
advancing the agenda for more open trade depends both on the existing policy framework and
the institutional set up.  On the policy front , the first requirement is to devise the means to avoid
crisis.  Or to put it differently, to prevent external shocks from turning into crises.  The second
challenge is to maintain the reformed policy regime steadfast in terms of uniformity of protection
among sectors.  On the institutional front, the task is to reform and create institutions that can
deal with the challenges arising from changed political equilibrium due to both external shocks5
and the building up of lobbying power of one group over the others to secure for themselves a
departure from uniformity.  4
III.  The Nature of the Trade Liberalizations
The late 1  980s and early 1  990s saw many trade liberalizations in Latin America and the
Caribbean.  While there had been trade liberalizations in the past, these liberalizations were
different from them in a number of respects.  First, the trade liberalizations had gone more deep
and wide compared to the past.  Second, they were based on the change in the ideology that came
about in the 1  980s which favored free markets and consequently liberal trade over restrictive
trade.  Third, the reforms were undertaken during huge adverse macroeconomic shocks, which
was a departure from the past, when the reaction to adverse  shocks was to tighten trade policies
rather than to liberalize them 3.  Finally, many accompanying reforms were undertaken with the
trade reforms, such as devaluation of the exchange rate, reduction of fiscal deficits, deregulation
and privatization of the many public enterprises.
Of course not all countries liberalized their trade regime to the same extent.  This was to
be expected given the importance that pressure groups play in the process.  Nonetheless, the
overall trade reforms were substantial compared to any other period in post World War II history
of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.  The reforms of the six countries discussed
here are representative of the trade reforms of the region.
In 1991, Argentina reduced average tariff rate to 15% and the variance in tariffs  to a 5-
22% range, and reduced the coverage of quantitative restrictions (QRs) from 62% of domestic
production in 1987, to a few items.  Chile has the best record for trade liberalization in Latin
4If  all groups  are able to lobby  equally,  then there cannot  be a departure  from uniformity. If no one is favored  then
all are favored. That is, if every sector were to receive  the same  extent  of protection  then no one is protected
relative  to the others. This is eloquently  expressed  in a line  of a song from Gilbert  and Sullivan's,  Pirates  of
Penzance,  "If everybody  is somebody,  then nobody  is anybody".
5See  1.  M. D. Little,  Richard  N.  Cooper,  W. Max Corden  and Sarath  Rajapatirana  "Boom, Crisis  and Adjustment:
Macroeconomic  Experiences  of Developing  Countries,"  Oxford  University  Press,  Oxford, 1993.6
America (see Table 1). By  1991 it had  reduced its average tariff to 11%, the variance in tariffs
to virtually zero and eliminated nearly all the quantitative restrictions  except for those needed
for health and national security reasons. Similarly, Colombia carried out a strong trade reforn  in
1992, accelerating the rate at which it had been bringing down protection, reducing the average
tariff level to 12%, the variance in tariffs to a 5-22% range and reducing QRs to less than 1% of
its imports.  Uruguay reformed its trade regime substantially in 1992. It reduced the average
tariff level to 18%, the tariff range to a 12-24% range and eliminated nearly all its QRs.
The two Caribbean countries considered here, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago also saw
strong trade reforms in the early 1  990s.  Jamaica reduced it average tariff level to 20%, the tariff
range to 0-45% and  maintained QRs on only 3 import items.  Trinidad and Tobago, reforming at
a less rapid rate, reduced its average tariff  also to  20% in conformity to the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) schedule, a tariff range of  0-45% and  reduced QRs considerably
through a negative list which applied to 40% of import items.  Like other Caribbean countries,
these two countries maintained non-tariff barriers in the form of stamp duties, surcharges and
differential consumption taxes.  But there is no doubt that the early 1990s saw the trade regime of
these two countries more open than any other time in the post World War I1 period.
While the trade reforms were extensive, there were many sectors that continued to be
protected even in the strongly liberalizing countries.  This is not surprising in the light of the
political economy forces at work that define the contours of policy making.  The variety of
experiences among the countries considered here - Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica,
Uruguay  and  Trinidad and Tobago - provide some scope for generalization as to why some
sectors were protected even though the effort to liberalize was extensive.
In the case of Argentina, two sectors and two regions continued to be protected despite
the strong reforms.  The sectors were automobiles and textiles and the regions, Tierra del  Fuego
and certain parts of Patagonia.  The two sectors were not competitive by any standard, and
carried political clout due to their strong connections to past governments in the case of
automobiles and to strong labor unions in the case of textiles.  One additional fact relevant to7
textiles is that since Argentina's textiles face quota restrictions in the US under the Multi Fibre
Arrangement there is a pre-disposition towards restrictions in the sector  not only on the export
side, but also on the import substitution side.  In the case of the protection of the two regions, the
use of trade policies might be considered an expedient, if harmful, substitute for regional
development policy measures.  It is worth noting that agriculture is not protected in Argentina
because of its substantial comparative advantage arising out of its land rich resource base.6
Instead, agriculture is taxed in Argentina.  Both nominal protection and producer subsidy
equivalent of support to agriculture were consistently negative. 7
Chile, the strong liberalizing economy has continued to protect  domestic agriculture
through a system of  reference prices.  A floor price and a ceiling price are established for few
agricultural imports.  These prices are based on a  sixty month moving average.  When the CIF
import prices fall below the range, duties are imposed to equate to the difference between the CIF
import price and the domestic floor price.  If the CIF price rises above the ceiling price, then
reference price is reduced to ceiling price level.  During the 1  990s, when international
agricultural prices fell, Chilean farmers producing a limited range of goods for the domestic
market were protected through the reference prices.  This type of protection was associated with
the effort to stabilize farm incomes when prices were falling and with the difficulties inherent in
moving farmers away from producing traditional crops.  At the same time that domestic import
substituting agriculture was protected, Chile was blazing a new trail with its tremendous success
with export agriculture which was not protected.  Chile was able to increase its agricultural
exports  by some ten fold in less than ten years.
Colombia also continued to protect agriculture despite its trade reforms, which were
among the fastest in the region.  In fact, Colombia  followed Chile in adopting a reference price
system to protect agriculture, presumably for the same reasons as that of  Chile.  Ad valorem
6  It has been  shown  that the factor  content  of Argentina's  exports  is dominated  by natural  resources  (in this case,
land),  confirmning  the Heckscher-Ohlin  model  of trade that  countries  export goods intensive  in the abundant  factor.
See Julio Berlinski  "Post Trade  Liberalization  Institutional  Issue  in Argentina," Turcato Di Tella Institute,  Buenos
Aires, 1994.
7  Valdes and  Schaeffer,  1993.8
import duties of 15-20% range are imposed  on some eight commodities (powdered milk, wheat,
barley, white and yellow maize, rice, sugar and sorghum). Price bands for these commodities are
based on a five year moving average of world prices where, the floor and ceiling price are
established every six months on the basis of monthly international price quotations.  Every two
weeks minimum prices are fixed by the Ministry of Agriculture based on international price
quotations.  The  duties paid on these eight items depend on the relationship of the import price
and the floor and ceiling prices of the band. In addition to the regular ad valorem tariff imposed
on the imports of these commodities, a specific duty is imposed to raise the import price to the
minimum price.  Thus, a  type of variable levy is imposed on all the eight products.
Consequently, agriculture producers enjoyed high income at the expense of consumers.8
Jamaica's  trade reforms left a number of exemptions, and the protection of some sectors
continued.  The vehicle for this was the exemptions from the  regular tariff schedule at the time
of the main trade liberalization (1991) and later the  exemptions from the CET of  CARICOM.
The exemptions applied to agriculture where a stamp duty was imposed at rates of 35-90%
compared to the CET of  20%.  There were also other items subject to protection through
differential consumption taxes.  These were automobiles, some agricultural imports, film
industry imports and purchases prescribed by the authorities from time to time.
Trinidad and Tobago also  maintained agriculture protection at the time of the trade
liberalization.  The main vehicle was surcharges imposed on agriculture imports.  The other
vehicles were stamp duties, different valuation bases and differential consumption taxes to
continue the protection of some sectors.  Consequently, there were substantial exemptions from
the CET of 20%.  In 1992, 92% of the QRs imposed on manufactured goods were removed.
Uruguay was slow in liberalizing its trade regime compared to the other southern cone
countries.  It continued to protect automobiles.  It also continued to use reference prices to
protect many manufactures that would face strong competition. such as cement.  It is in the
s  Valdes  and Schaeffer, 1993.9
process of converging its tariffs to the CET established by MERCOSUR which has four ranges
from 5-20%.  Like Argentina, Uruguay did not protect agriculture because of its comparative
advantage in agriculture arising from the rich land resources.
Institutional Arrangements
The continuance of protection at the time of liberalization reflected the particular power
of an industry or a sector to lobby to alter the political equilibrium.  This was facilitated by the
institutional arrangements for trade policy making that existed at the time.  Such arrangements
include institutions which made trade policy, the rules and procedures that were followed and the
procedures to consider requests for protection from import surges. These arrangements
determine the extent to which departures from uniformity took place along with the different
lobbying interests.  In other words, institutional arrangements influence the supply side of
protection while lobbying power of different activities and sectors determine the demand side.
None of the countries reformed their  institutional arrangements for trade policy making
at the time of the trade liberalization.  Many reasons can be adduced for this outcome.  First,
since trade liberalizations were undertaken at times of crises, there was little opportunity to
reform the trade policy making institutions at the same time.  Second, institutional reform is as
difficult as it is necessary to provide credibility to the continuance of a trade regime.  Third, the
manner in which the trade policy had been made at the  time of the liberalization had been ad
hoc,  with little attention paid to a systematic approach to institutional issues. Finally, many of
the countries had become GATT members in late 1980s. GATT conventions for anti-dumping,
countervailing and the provision of safeguards were not followed at that time but were planned to
be adopted at a later date. 9
In Argentina almost all trade-related functions were carried out by the Ministry of the
Economy.  The responsibilities for extemal trade negotiations were shared with the  Foreign
9 J. Michael Finger  has noted that  GATT provisions  regarding "exceptional protection" make
political rather  than  economic sense.  See Finger,  1995.10
Ministry. 1 No independent statutory body existed to review trade policy or its practice, at the
time of the trade liberalization. Nearly all the trade reforms were introduced through resolutions
without laws passed for the purpose to enable  the reformns  to be grounded in a well defined legal
framework.  Laws such as buy Argentinean goods (compre argentina) passed in 1963 did exist
however, reflecting the earlier mind set regarding  import substitution based industrialization.
They continued  on the books during the liberalization. They were not enforced at the time and
were later rescinded.  The trade reforms, as radically different as they were, came to be based on
resolutions and decrees with implementing institutions remaining unchanged. Laws recluire
some support and consensus from the opposition, while decrees require only  agreement within
the cabinet.  1  l  While the use of decrees provides speed, it also permits somewhat easier
modification of policies in the future and creates uncertainty as to whether a particular policy
can be reversed  by a  future government.
Chile introduced one of the most wide-ranging trade reforms for any country in 1974. By
1979 a uniform tariff of I0% was adopted with the only exception being the import tariffs on
motor cars.  However, no  attempts were made to change the institutional framework despite the
radical trade policy reforms.  The main reform was led by the Minister for the Economy. 2  The
trade liberalization led to uniform protection with tariffs as the only form of protection.  The
latter being the hiall  mark of a liberal trade regime.  It also facilitated transparency of incentives.
Ilowever. somc exemptions were granted even by Chile during its liberalization for agriculture
and motor cars.
Colonmbia's  most recent trade liberalization was undertaken in 1991. Because the country
had  excess reserves and the adminiistrationl  was conviniced  that rapid liberalization could bring
rapid benceits. trade liberalizationi  was accelerated. particularly on the import side.  However, at
the time the policy chaniges  were being made. Colombia had a complicated paraphernalia of
inStitUtiO1S tIhat were  makinig  and implementing trade policv.  It had a powerful trade
(ATF.  Aroentiia:  1Trade  P'olic\ Review.  Geneva.  1992.
Juilio  Berliiiski. 1994.
Vittorio  Corbo.  1991.11
implementation authority called the Instituto Colombiano de Comercio Exterior (INCOMEX)
and complicated rules governing duty drawbacks, export credit and export certificate schemes.
These remained in place.
In Jamaica too, trade reforms were taking place in a pre-existing protectionist institutional
framework.  There, trade policy  making was largely the responsibility of the Ministry of
Finance.  Trade policies were closely coordinated with foreign exchange allocation.  Import
licenses and access to foreign exchange had been administered with the close cooperation
between  the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank.
The situation in Trinidad and Tobago was not very different from Jamaica.  Decisions
regarding changes in tariff, QRs, stamp duties, surcharges, exemptions and the like were  made
by the Ministry of Finance, under advice of the Industrial Development Corporation that reported
to the Minister of Trade.  That institution was responsible for granting concessions to domestic
producers while the Export Development Corporation provided "concessions" such as duty free
imports to exporters.  When trade liberalization took place  in late 1992, the institutional
arrangements for trade policy making continued as before.
In Uruguay too, trade liberalization was not accompanied by any change in the
institutions in charge of trade policy making.  Nor were the laws changed in a significant way to
match the more liberal trade regime that came into existence.  Trade policy decision  making was
done by the Minister of the Economy and Finance.  The  implementing authority was the Office
of the Planning and the Budget. 13
To summarize, based on the experiences of the countries considered here, no country
attempted to change its institutional structure at the time of the trade liberalization.  In some
cases, the liberalizations were radical and represented a complete change in the trade policy
framework.  These were not  policy changes alone but regime changes whenever the entire basis
13Gustavo Michelin  "Uruguay  Post Trade  Liberalization  Issues,"  CERES,  Montevideo,  1994  (mimeo).12
for the existing policy framework was changed.  It was only later that  institutional changes were
put in place to bring about a conformity of trade policy with the institutional aspects of trade
policy making.
IV. Post Trade Liberalization Experiences
The six countries that are considered here had varied experience with regard to trade
liberalization experiences. This diversity in experiences arose from their different sizes, resource
endowments, different times and speeds  of trade liberalizations.  Yet, they also share  new and
common experiences.  There have been few instances of reversals in trade policy making.  But
they have not changed the character of  the trade regime in terms of their policy direction or
content.  The reversals to date have been somewhat marginal. They have taken the form of new
instruments such as wide use of reference prices and customs valuation, anti-dumping and the
promotion of one sector over another through differential domestic taxes and subsidies.
It is not  surprising that there have been some partial reversals.  The main contention of
the political economy approach to policy reform is validated in these reversals.  The political
coalition that led to the liberalization cannot be sustained for long periods.  In addition, there
have been pressures that were building up for protection given that the traditional weapons of
choice for protection tariffs and QRs are proscribed by national policies adopted during this
period.  All the countries in this group had become members of GATT, which precluded the
flagrant violation of the relevant codes.  However, the pressures for protection arise from the
continuing sectoral interests to secure for themselves greater private profits at the expense of
consumers, other  sectors which use the protected product as an input and  exports which are hurt
through import protection. The pressures manifest themselves in new types of protection
commonly called  'exceptional protection" such as antidumping, countervailing duties and
subsidies.  There has been additional pressure brought about by the large capital inflows after the
debt crisis of the earlv eighties.  Capital inflows have led to appreciations in  the exchange rates
and, the appreciations in turn have reduced the domestic currency prices of imports and exports.13
In the meantime, there have been significant changes in the domestic institutional
environment since it was not dealt with at the time of the trade liberalizations.  It must have
become apparent that appropriate institutions were needed to deal with the pressures for
protection.  They are also needed to advance the agenda for further liberalization.  In addition
trade policy making institutions had to be adopted to the provisions of the Uruguay Round.
In Argentina, there has been an increase in the variance of protection while the average
level of protection may have remained unchanged. There has been an attempt to extend the
special regime accorded to the motor car industry to other industries.  Thus, other industries are
allowed  reduced  import duties for exports, if they enter into an agreement with the Ministry of
Trade to convert their industries  to export more. These industries are allowed to import capital
goods at a lower tariff  rate with  an agreement with the Ministry of Industry. The statistical tax
was raised from 3% to 10% and later returned to 3%. Anti-dumping activity had increased,
specially directed against Brazil which had a depreciated exchange rate before the "Plano Real,"
relative to the Argentinean peso.  The latter has been fixed in relation to the US dollar as a part
of the Convertibility Plan.  The  final outcome of these reversals has not  been so much  an
increase in protection, as much as an increase in the variance of protection.  The three tier tariff
rate which was adopted in 1991, became a seven tier tariff structure. There has also been an
attempt to fine-tune export incentives, with different coefficients prescribed for different
"production chains" to determine tariff reimbursement rates.  Three basic  reasons can be
adduced for this partial reversal. First, the appreciation of the peso given its fixed nominal
exchange rate, even though domestic inflation rate has remained unprecedently low for
Argentina.  Second, an incomplete trade reform had reduced automobile protection but did not
eliminate it.  This has given other industries the occasion to ask and receive special concessions.
Finally, until last year, there has not been a transparent  mechanism  to provide exceptional
protection.  In other words, the absence of a proper safeguard mechanism had created the
opportunity for sectoral interests to ask for sector specific protection when import threats
appeared such as in the case of sports shoes and certain kinds of paper.14
In  Chile there has been very little departure from the pattern of protection observed since
1986, despite strong pressures to grant protection to few of the dominant sectors.  Agriculture has
been able to secure a measure of protection through the price band mechanism.  Reference prices
to  protect some activities have become a weapon of  choice.  Anti-dumping measures have also
increased compared to the past.  These minor departures from a highly liberalized trade regime
do not herald a change in policy.  If anything, Chile is more committed to free trade than ever
before. 1 4 The new democratically elected government of Chile adopted the trade policies of the
earlier regime without great fanfare. This shows that Chile has remained steadfastly committed
to free trade.  As a part of the  effort to resist pressures for protection, Chile adopted several
institutional arrangements.
Colombia has also held on to liberalized trade.  The Gaviria administration was strongly
committed to the idea of liberal trade.  It accelerated the rate of trade reforms.  The tariff levels
that were to prevail in 1994 were reached in 1991. It eliminated almost all QRs,  lowered tariffs
significantly and stopped the allocation of foreign exchange based on import licenses.  There
have been few anti-dumping actions, though they are not described as such. These relate to the
poultry industry and textiles.  Meanwhile, agriculture protection continued.
There has been very few if any reversals in Jamaica.  One reason for this is that it did not
have as low protection levels as Argentina, Colombia or Chile.  Even after it had liberalized,
Jamaica had higher levels of protection relative to its competitors.  For example, it had a tariff
level of 5-30% in 1994. Jamaica has to confirm to the CARICOM common external tariff or
change them unilaterally.  It has taken the former path and has committed to adopt 5-20% range
CET by 1997. Although Jamaica has resolved not to use reference prices, it has de facto
continued to use them in the absence of implementing the GATT valuation system.  In the
meantime, stamp duties on some agriculture imports have continued.
14  However,  automobile  protection  has  continued  because  of contracts  with  motor  car  producers  that
had been signed some 20 years ago.  These contracts  will be renegotiated  in the future  with lower or
no protection.15
Similarly, Trinidad and Tobago has had had few changes in the levels of protection.
Although the stamp duties were removed, surcharges on agricultural imports have continued.
They are to be removed by 1997. This resulted from duty exemptions that helped to raise
effective protection with reduced nominal protection on imported inputs.  QRs were reimposed
on the import of chicken parts from the U.S.
Uruguay also experienced reversals in the form of giving additional concessions to the
automobile industry and the adoption of a price band measure for agriculture that is protectionist.
Institutional  Clhanges
Constant protectionist pressure has led to partial reversals.  This induced a host of
institutional changes to the trade regimes in these countries for several reasons.  First, the issue
had not been addressed before.  Second, the possibility of policy reversals may have encouraged
the governments to meet the challenge of  matching institutional reform  with the policy changes.
Third, the Uruguay Round negotiations were going on during the post liberalization period and
the need arose to make institutional arrangements consistent with the new GATT rules.
Argentina has established a National Trade Commission charged with the responsibility
of advising the government on trade policy-making and for considering the requests for
protection on a continuous basis.  The Commission is linked to the Secretary of Trade and
Investment who reports to the Minister of  Economy.  The Commission is expressly charged with
making investigations regarding unfair trade practices, study safeguards, analyze the extent of
injury  said to occur  and to suggest remedies to alleviate injury. Earlier, any  import price that
was below  15% of the domestic price in Argentina could be countered by a reference price which
would equate that the import price to the domestic market price.  Following the creation of the
commission, a process for contingent protection is to be established.
Chile established a National Commission on Trade in 1986. Its  purpose was to
determine the extent of  "distortions "  in the world price of imports.  The Commission is by law16
composed of the President of the country, the Ministers of Finance, Economy and External
Affairs.  Its purpose was to consider complaints against unfair trade practices, undertake neutral
inquiries and establish the veracity of the claims of injury and remedies, if there is demonstrable
injury.  The process is highly transparent.  The request for an inquiry has to be published within
thirty days of the application, and the Commission has to  give the results of its analysis within
ninety days.  The remedies  proposed could be and indeed were, tariff surcharges to the extent of
the apparent subsidy.
Colombia established a Foreign Trade Ministry  getting rid of a highly protectionist
import administration led by INCOMEX, an arch-typical import licensing regime.  Earlier, the
trade institutional structure was prescribed by the Law of 444 of 1967. This law gave
INCOMEX, among others, power to implement trade policy.  INCOMEX had administered the
quota regime, provided import licenses on pre-existing plans and monitored the progress of
sectoral compliance.  The 1992 reforms changed all that.  With the establishment of the new
Foreign Trade  Ministry, the govemment hoped to have uniform incentives.  It established a very
stringent criteria for safeguards, countervailing and anti-dumping which are subject to public
inquiry.  Under the new Colombian law, actual injury must be demonstrated.  It is not sufficient
to say that there would be potential injury. The relief granted is restricted to one year.  In this
sense, Colombia's  law is more stringent than that of the GATT to provide contingent protection.
Jamaica has also changed its trade policy making apparatus.  While the decisions are still
taken at the ministerial level, other agencies are consulted when anti-dumping and countervailing
issues are to be contemplated.  A  consumer representative was added to the anti-dumping
committee.  A one year sun-set clause was introduced for anti-dumping.  And an expiration date
was defined for countervailing duties.
In Trinidad and Tobago, the main change in trade policy making institutions was the
creation of three corporations led by the Trade and Tourism Development Corporation to
administer trade, industry and export development concessions including exceptional protection.17
The government is in the process of defining an appropriate framework for the new institutions
to operate.
Uruguay had a tariff commission in the past, but it had not been used much.  In 1992,
Uruguay established an Application Commission which was to consider and help resolve issues
relating to the injury of domestic industry due to import surges.  An application for relief from
import competition has to be evaluated within thirty days. Another ninety days are permitted for
a decision by the Application Committee to grant or deny  the application.  But it is the Minister
of Finance who will decide on the type of measures to be adopted should a situation of  dumping,
subsidization or similar  unfair trade practice is directed at domestic industry.  Uruguay  has not
used anti-dumping before, since it did not want to point an accusative finger at its powerful
northern neighbors.  It was inhibited against the use of countervailing duties as other countries
would also ask that the same item be countervailed in their own countries. There was also the
fear of retaliation if anti-dumping action is  taken.
The institutional reforms identified above lend themselves to a few generalizations.  First,
institutional changes that support the liberalized trade regimes always followed rather than led
policy reform.  Perhaps this is an inevitable sequence given the extent of  effort required to bring
about institutional changes, with its political economy ramifications.  Second,  there has been an
attempt to give central focus to trade policy making institutions by moving it from different
agencies to a single agency.  This is the experience of Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay.
In the two Caribbean countries, the Ministries of Finance continue to be involved with trade
policy making even though in Trinidad and Tobago, three corporations were put in charge of
administering trade, industry and foreign concessions.  The centralization of trade policy
decisions would serve national interests better than if a sectoral ministry were given that
responsibility.  Third, despite the liberalizations, some sectors have continued to receive
protection.  In the  countries considered here, the common sectors protected are automobiles,
textiles and agriculture. The protection of the automobile sector is explained more by historical
reasons.  It particular, the automobile industry was able to wield lobbying power through it
association with past govermments based on large rents earned due to protection and forging18
close links to decision making agencies.  Textile protection can be explained by the importance
of the labor movement in the textile sector and the contagion effects of the export quotas
administered through the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. Agriculture protection has continued due to
the difficulties of adjustment from the lack of easy alternative employment opportunities for the
rural workers and the public interest in maintaining stability of their incomes.  Fourth, there have
been attempts to introduce measures to provide relief to activities which have been subject to
increased competition from imports, on the grounds of trade practices.  Many countries have
used reference prices more than anti-dumping. Proper GATT consistent safeguards have not
been adopted.>15  Equally, countries have desisted a wide use of anti-dumping for the effort
involved. the fear of retaliation and that others would  follow the lead of one country if it were to
target a particular exporter.  Fifth, many countries have made their  institutions more consistent
with GATT rules than in the past even though those rules themselves were evolving.  The
standards required for establishing and implementing a safeguards system are more stringent than
that of usinig  anti-dumping.  Even so, countries in the group have used reference prices which
operate like anti-dumping actions.  Finally, there were attempts to provide support for export
interests tlhrouglh  public interventions. Chile gives subsidies to small and medium size exporters
tinder PROCHILE. Columbia reformed its plethora of promotion schemes to be confined to a
Bank lor Foreign Trade and an Export Promotion Trust.  Trinidad and Tobago created an Export
Developmenit  Corporation for the purpose.
V.  Lessons and Remedies
Based on these experiences. the first lesson is that the largest challenge to maintaining
openi  trade regimies  on the policy side arises from the macroeconomic situation.  In the past.
many of the trade liberalizations were reversed due to macroeconomic crises arising from
ulisustainiable curreint  accouLit  positionls  and appreciation of the exchange rate.  While there has
not beeni  a significant reversal in the countries discussed above. some partial reversals have
Safeguards  provide  the  political  coxver  to pr otect.  See  Finger  1995.19
taken place.1 6 They could be said to be associated with exchange rate appreciations due to
capital inflows.  In the six countries considered here, It has been shown that what the reversals
did mainly was to lead to departures from uniformity rather than a significant increase in overall
protection.17 Chile, which had reduced protection to 10% uniform tariff in 1979, had to raise the
average tariff to 35% in 1983, because the Manufacturers Association was able to lobby
successfully during the economic crisis of 1983. It was able to lower protection when the
economy recovered and saw strong growth.
The second lesson is that trade policy making has to be kept under constant review if
reversals are to be avoided.  The cost of protection must be  publicized and communicated to the
community at large. For example, the cost of maintaining a job in the automobile industry or in
textiles would serve as a good indicator of trade distortions.  Society would not support
protection of automobile production when the cost of  maintaining a job in the automobile
industry is more than ten fold of per capita income as in some cases.  A report prepared under the
Chairmanship of Fritz Leutwiler before the start of the Uruguay Round noted that governrnents
should be required to explain and defend their overall trade policies.'8 In fact, that report
proposed the preparation of a protection balance sheet showing the various cost of protectionist
devices ranging from border measures such as tariffs and quotas to  domestic  industry specific
subsidies.  Effective rates of assistance that denote the cost of  non-border measures have been
used extensively during the negotiation of the Uruguay Round to demonstrate the costs of
domestic subsidies in agriculture in Europe. This type of information would be useful as
counterweight to the lobbying efforts of entrenched protectionist interests in developing
countries as well.
16  Some countries  not discussed here, Venezuela and Brazil, have seen more substantial  reversals  in
the form of foreign exchange controls in the case of the former and raising  import  duties in the case
of the latter.
''  Corbo, 1991.
I  Trade Policies for a Better Future, Proposals for Action, GATT, Geneva, 1985.20
Third, there must be measures that help with the adjustment of domestic activities to short
run price movements that do not lead to protection.  The danger is that the assistance can
become permanent and could be unrelated long price term trends.  Cash grants to farmers
independent of production levels, a good safeguard mechanism and pre-announced liberalizations
are means that are available to prevent slippage in trade policy when there are exogenous shocks
such as a price collapse.  Agriculture has been successful in receiving and maintaining protection
precisely because it has little recourse to adjustment.  Protection is extended in lieu of
adjustment.  In addition, if special attention is given to  the farmers who have limited
opportunities to diversify their resource use, there will not be a very sympathetic  hearing for
protection, for which whole society has to pay a price.
Fourth, extemal commitments can be used to discourage a return to protection through
GATT bindings and CETs agreements under customs unions.  The bindings can help to put
domestic protectionist interests under notice that raising protection would  contravene
intemational agreements and obligations.  Similarly, a limit put on a CET could provide a
ceiling on protection.  However, care must be taken to prevent  CET exemptions from taking
place as has happened under CARICOM.  There is a new danger that the rules of origin could
become a protective device by keeping out goods of non-member countries; in that case, external
commitments could inhibit freer trade.
Finally, a continuing reform agenda that extends beyond trade policies would help to
maintain liberalized trade regimes and to push the trade agenda further. Reform of labor
markets, domestic regulation and access to capital would allow the adjustment to changes in
world price easier. This way, factors of production can be allowed to move from one activity to
another smoothly and prevent the build up of pressures that lead to protection.  In this sense,
protection is a price that has to be paid for non-adjustment.  Making adjustments easier would
help to maintain open trade and push the liberalization agenda further.21
Institutional  Remedies and Mechanisms
While the above lessons would serve to keep the policy frameworks open, there are
institutional features that favor liberalized trade.  Such institutional remedies have worked well in
some cases.  One well known example is the Australian Trade Commission. 19 While some of its
past effectiveness has been reduced due to sectoral pressures, it remains as an example of a good
trade policy review device.
Many experiences of institutional remedies for maintaining liberalized  trade regimes and
keeping the trade regime open for further liberalization suggest that an independent advisory
authority or commission such as those adopted by Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay would be a
good device.  These commissions use a transparent process, and are one step removed from the
policy makers.  It enables them to undertake inquiries without being subject to political or
sectoral pressures.  The principal characteristics of such an institutional arrangement can be
summarized as the following:
First, make the body advisory, independent of day to day trade policy making so that it
could conduct its work in a steady manner, free from administrative pressures and exigencies.
Second, inquiries into the requests for protection must be conducted in an open and
transparent manner and the findings of such inquiries must be subject to public scrutiny.
Third, the procedures for granting relief such as through a safeguard mechanism must
reflect all interests and parties including consumers, exporters and users of the product in
question as an input.
19  John Spriggs "Towards an Intemational Transparency Institution- Australian Style," World Economy, vol. 14,
1991.22
Finally, the analysis used to establish injury must conform to high technical standards and
the criteria used for considering trade policies must always reflect national interests and not that
of any particular sector.Table 1:  Indicators  of Trade  Regimes Pre and Post Liberalization
Average Unweighted  Coverage of QRs on Imports
Country  Legal Tariff  Rates (%)  Tariff  Range (%)  (% of tariff lines, unless
(pre-liberalization,  post-liberalization)4"  . otherwise noted)-W
Pre-reform  Post-reform  Pre-reform  Post-reform  Pre-reform  Post-reform
Argentina (1 987, 1991)  42 (p)  15  15-115 (p)  5-22  62 (of dom. prod.)  A few
Chile(1984,  1991)  35  11  35  1  Minimal  0
Colombia (1984, 1992)  61  12  0-220  5-20  99
Jamaica (1981, 1991)  NA  20  NA  0-45  NA  0(3)
Trinidad & Tobago (1989, 1991)  NA  41 (p)  NA  0-103 (p)  NA  A few
Uruguay (1987, 1992)  32  18  10-55  12-24  0  0
Source: Alam and Rajapatirana, 1993.
a/  The pre-liberalization  year  was chosen  to contrast  with  the  post  trade  liberalization  year.  It denotes  the  undertaking  of some  significant
liberalization  measures,  but  not the  exact  year  of trade  liberalization  itself,  e.g.,  Chile liberalized  its  trade  regime  in 1974 and  Colombia  in
1991.
b/  Even  where  tariff  line  coverage  is small,  domestic  production  coverage  may  be significant.References
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